We construct and estimate a uni…ed model combining three of the main sources of cross-country income disparities: di¤erences in factor endowments, barriers to technology adoption and the inappropriateness of frontier technologies to local conditions. The key components are di¤erent types of workers, distortions to capital accumulation, directed technical change, costly adoption and spillovers from the world technology frontier. Despite JEL Classi…cation: F43, O11, O31, O33, O38, O41, O43, O47.
Introduction
New technologies do not di¤use instantaneously, and adoption lags are considered a major determinant of productivity di¤erences across …rms and nations. In a classic paper, Griliches (1957) documents that new more productive seeds of hybrid corn di¤used slowly across US agricultural regions, with a 15-year lag between adoption in Iowa and Alabama, and that their di¤usion was a¤ected by local conditions, such as geography and market potential. The spread of more recent technologies follows a similar pattern. Kiessling (2009) there is evidence that di¤erences in technology are a key determinant of cross-country income disparities. A large body of research measuring total factor productivity (TFP) as the Solow residual of an aggregate production function typically …nds the latter to account for roughly 50% of observed di¤erences in output per worker. Beyond being a measure of our ignorance, this residual is nothing but a generic notion of technology, i.e., the mapping from factors to aggregate production.
What all these pieces of evidence suggest is that, if we are to understand income disparities, we need a theory for how di¤erent types of technologies are developed and adopted across countries. In turn, this requires unbundling the concept of TFP into a set of heterogeneous technologies and to identify what country-speci…c factors facilitate the adoption of certain innovations more than others. To this end, a parsimonious description of technology is provided by the following aggregate production function:
were Y , K, H and L are output, physical capital, skilled and unskilled labor, respectively. The state of technology is identi…ed by the parameters A L and A H , which measure the e¢ ciency with which the economy uses unskilled and skilled labor, respectively. The parameter , instead, captures the elasticity of substitution between the two types of workers. Given data on factors and a value for , any di¤erences in Y can be generated by allowing technology, A L and A H , to vary. While accounting exercises based on (1) are certainly useful, the crucial question is to understand how technologies are developed and why they may di¤er across countries.
Providing a theoretical answer to these questions and confronting it to the data is the main goal of this paper.
Building on Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) (henceforth, AZ01) and Gancia and Zilibotti (2009), we propose a theory of directed technical change and technology adoption that yields a micro-founded version of the aggregate production function (1) . In the model, an advanced economy, identi…ed with the US and called for simplicity the North, develops endogenously the world technology frontier, represented by the pair (A LN ; A HN ). As in models of horizontal innovation (see Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) for a survey), the world technology frontier is given by the stock of existing machines and, as in models of directed technical change (e.g., AZ01
and Acemoglu 2002), R&D e¤ort can be devoted to develop H-or L-complement machines. 1 In the benchmark case, we assume that there is no trade in technology -e.g., due to the lack of international protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) -so that new machines are sold in the North only. 2 As a result, the equilibrium skill-bias of the world technology frontier is proportional to the skill-endowment of the North. To capture the advantage of backwardness emphasized, among others, by Nelson and Phelps (1966) , and Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006) we assume that all other countries can adopt existing technologies at a cost which is decreasing in their distance from the frontier. Besides this cost, technology adoption -just like innovation -is pro…t-driven and depends on local economic conditions, such as the abundance of complementary factors (K, L and H) and the size of domestic markets. This combination of the theory of directed technical change with international knowledge spillovers allows us 1 The notion of directed technical change stretches back to Kennedy (1964) . Acemoglu (1998) constructs a quality-ladder model of directed technical change to study the patterns of wage inequality in the US in the 1970's and 1980's. 2 We relax this assumption in an extension where we introduce international license contracts on the use of technology.
to build a tractable model of cross-country technology di¤erences suitable for quantitative analysis.
The resulting model yields structural equations that can be used to estimate its two key parameters: the elasticity of substitution between the skilled and unskilled labor, , and the elasticity of the adoption cost to the technology gap, , capturing exogenous barriers to knowledge ‡ows. From these estimates, our methodology allows us to tease out the relative importance of two distinct sources of low productivity: technology inappropriateness and distance to frontier. To see why, note that when barriers to adoption are very low, a country will operate with the best technologies; yet, to the extent that frontier technologies are highly skill biased they will be of limited use in skill-scarce countries, thereby generating low aggregate productivity. On the contrary, countries well inside the frontier are free to choose a more optimal mix of technologies, so that their low productivity will be mostly explained by barriers to adoption, rather than the skill-technology mismatch.
To estimate the elasticity of substitution between the skilled and unskilled labor, we use time-series data on the skill premium and the relative skill supply in the US (the frontier economy). The second parameter, , measuring barriers to technology adoption, is instead estimated from a micro-founded version of equation (1) . That is, given data on Y , K, H and L, we search for the constant (across all adopting countries and also for di¤erent income groups) that minimizes the sum of squared deviations between predicted and observed relative output. Despite the parsimonious parameterization, the …t of the model is remarkably good, indicating that the underlying theory of technological change and di¤usion, which places skill endowment, domestic market size and international spillovers as the cornerstone, is broadly consistent with the data. Similarly to Caselli and Coleman (2006) , we …nd that virtually all adopting countries are inside the world technology frontier, that skill scarce countries tend to adopt predominantly unskilled-labor complement innovations and that barriers to adoption are higher in less developed countries. We also …nd evidence that barriers to technology adoption are relatively stable over the period 1970-2000 among non-OECD economies, while they appear to have fallen for OECD countries. The extreme versions of the model, in which each country develops local technologies independently or in which all country share the same technology, are instead rejected by the data. We also compare the …t of the model under alternative speci…cations for the cost of adopting technologies that allow us to vary the strength of market size e¤ects and under the assumption of free trade in goods.
With our preferred parameterization, we use the model to perform a series of counterfactuals. First, we show that removing barriers to technology adoption would increase gross domestic product per worker (GDP pw) relative to the US from 0.19 to 0.61 for the average non-OECD country and from 0.68 to 0.91 for the average OECD country. The e¤ect is particularly strong for small countries, which lack the local market size required to bene…t from expensive technologies. Second, we study the e¤ect of institutional changes associated to the process of globalization, focusing on the integration of markets for goods and technology.
As noted by AZ01 and Acemoglu (2003) , trade liberalization may have triggered skill-biased technical change (SBTC) in the US during the last two decades of the 20th century and this may have ampli…ed cross-country income di¤erences. To illustrate the global impact of this phenomenon, we compute the e¤ect both on the world technology frontier and on adopting countries of removing barriers to trade in goods. As trade with skill-scarce countries increase the relative price of skill-intensive goods in the skill-abundant North, it fosters the incentives to introduce skill-complement technologies. The e¤ect on technology adoption is however ambiguous. On the one hand, the increase in the skill bias of the frontier technology makes the adoption of skill-complement technologies cheaper. On the other hand, the rise in the relative price of low-skill-intensive goods in skill-scarce countries promotes the adoption of less skill-biased technologies. We …nd that, given the estimated parameters, trade would induce most followers to adopt more skill-biased technologies than in the absence of trade. Thus, trade tends to exacerbate the inappropriateness of technologies to the local endowments of non-frontier economies. The result is a global increase in skill premia (a factor of 2.9 for the average country), but also in the cross-country income gap (on average, GDP pw relative to the US falls by 13 percentage points). 3 On the contrary, allowing trade in technology too (i.e., the leader can licence its technology to follower countries), by fostering the incentives to introduce unskilled-labor complement innovations, reduces wage inequality and induces income convergence worldwide.
The paper contributes to a large literature, surveyed in Caselli (2005) , aimed at decomposing cross-country income disparities into input di¤erences and unmeasured productivity.
We depart from earlier works (e.g., Hall and Jones, 1999) by assuming, consistently with all 3 We should stress that these very large e¤ects correspond to the extreme experiment of moving from no trade to completely free trade. Clearly, partial trade liberalization would give smaller e¤ects.
available evidence, a less than in…nite elasticity of substitution between workers of di¤erent skill level and by endogenizing productivity. Among more recent contributions, the closest paper is Caselli and Coleman (2006) , who also decompose income using the aggregate production function (1) . There are two main di¤erences, however. First, they back out the pair (A L ; A H ) using data on input, but also factor prices. On the contrary, our theoretical model delivers structural equations that can be used to estimate (1) without relying on cross-country factor prices, which are notoriously di¢ cult to obtain for a large sample and not always of (on average, they are adopted 47 years after their invention), and that di¤erences in the speed of technology adoption are not only large, but also surprisingly persistent over time.
The fact that technologies originating from advanced countries may be excessively skill biased for the endowments of less developed countries, and that this may act both as a barrier to adoption and as source of low productivity, has been put forward by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969) , Basu and Weil (1998) , and AZ01. Our approach is most related to AZ01. The main di¤erence is that they only focus on the case in which all countries share the same technology.
In the current model, instead, aggregate productivity in less developed countries is relatively low both because of the technology-skill mismatch identi…ed in AZ01 and because of costly adoption.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 builds the benchmark model of a world economy where a technology leader engages in directed innovation, while a large number of less advanced countries engage in directed technology adoption. It provides a microfoundation for the aggregate production function (1) and illustrates three main sources of low aggregate productivity: lack of capital, distance to frontier and technology inappropriateness. Section 3 extends the model by …rst allowing trade in goods and then in technology (IPR protection)
too. Section 4 estimates the model and quanti…es the relative importance of the three sources of income di¤erences. The empirical model is then used to perform counterfactual exercises and sensitivity analysis. Section 5 concludes.
The Benchmark Model
In this section, we present a model of directed technical change closely related to Acemoglu, Gancia and Zilibotti (2011) and Gancia and Zilibotti (2009). The key ingredients are di¤erent types of labor (skilled and unskilled workers), cross-country di¤erences in factor endowments and factor-biased (directed) technical progress. In addition, we consider physical capital accumulation, which was ignored in previous work. Moreover, we emphasize the distinction between the introduction of frontier technologies (innovation) which is carried out in the "North", and the sluggish process of imitation and adaptation of such technologies to less developed countries (the "South"). We refer to the latter as technology adoption. Adoption is assumed to be cheaper than innovation, creating a laggard advantage. However, since technical change is directed to the factor endowment of the North, the South faces a menu of technologies to imitate that are overly skill biased, given its lower skilled endowment.
Preferences
The world consists of a technology leader (the North), and a set of non-technological leaders (the South), all populated by in…nitely lived agents endowed with logarithmic preferences. We denote by N the frontier economy and by S 2Ŝ = fS 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S n g a generic Southern economy.
More formally, the utility function of the representative agent in each country is given by:
where J 2 fN; Sg and is the discount rate. The optimal consumption plan satis…es the Euler equation, _ c Jt =c Jt = r Jt ; where the interest rate r Jt may be di¤erent across countries, since capital markets are not integrated. We remove time indexes when this is no source of confusion.
Technology
Final output, used for both consumption and investment, is produced by a representative competitive …rm subject to the following production function: When J = 1; there is no distortion, and the standard condition equating the interest rate to the marginal product of capital holds. Substituting back K J into (2) yields:
Pro…t maximization implies then the following inverse demand functions:
where P L and P H are the prices of Y L and Y H , respectively. Note that
The production function at the sector level is given by: The producers of Y L and Y H are also competitive. Their pro…t maximization yields the following relative demand equations: 
where Z 1 is a parameter that will allow us to match the level of the skill premium in the benchmark case. The industry equilibrium is subject to the resource constraints
where L J and H J are assumed to be in …xed supply. As the monopolists face a demand curve with the constant price elasticity of , it is optimal for them to set prices equal to p
where w L and w H are the wage of unskilled and skilled workers, respectively. This pricing formula also implies that pro…ts per …rm are a fraction 1= of revenues:
Using symmetry and labor market clearing yields l J (i) = L J =A LJ and h J (i) = H J =A HJ , which in turn allows to express sectorial output as:
Note that output in each sector is a linear function of labor and of the state of technology.
Plugging (6) into (4) yields the relative price:
whereÃ A H =A L is the skill bias of the technology andh H=L is the relative skill endowment. Note that "tilde" denotes relative (skill-to-unskill) variables. Relative wages and pro…ts can be found using (7), and noting that p LJ L J = P LJ Y LJ and p HJ ZH J = P HJ Y HJ :
Equation (9) shows that the relative pro…tability, H = L , has two components: a "price e¤ect", whereby rents are higher in sectors producing more expensive goods, and a "market size e¤ect", whereby rents are higher in bigger sectors. The equalization of pro…t ‡ows yields the equilibrium skill bias of technology in the North:
SubstitutingÃ N into (8) yields the steady-state skill premium:
To …nd the growth rate, we note that the interest rate is pinned down by either of the two free entry conditions, e.g., r N = HN = = P HN ZH N = ( ) : Using (3), (4) and (6) to eliminate P HN , normalizing N = 1; and using the Euler equation yields the balanced growth rate of the economy,
It can be shown that, along the balanced growth path, Y N , c N , K N , A HN and A LN all grow at the rate g N .
Directed Technology Adoption in the South
Southern countries are assumed to be skill scarce, namely,h S <h N for all S 2Ŝ, and to start from a lower technology level in both the skilled and unskilled sector. 
where A LN and A HN represent the world technology frontiers in the two sectors. That is, the farther behind a country is relative to the skill-speci…c frontier, the cheaper it is to adopt technologies in that sector. With this formulation, the total cost of adopting the entire set of z-complement technologies (with z 2 fH; Lg) is:
This expression shows that can be interpreted as an inverse measure of barriers to technology adoption in the South. All intermediate inputs adopted in the South are sold by local monopolists.
In steady state, free entry implies HS = LS = c HS =c LS : Using this condition together with equations (9), (10) and (13), we can solve for the skill bias of the technology in the South:
Technology adoption in the South depends on the skill endowment of the North and of the local economy. On the one hand, local skill abundance increases the pro…tability of adopting skill-complement innovations. On the other hand, skill abundance in the North means that the frontier technology is more skill biased, and that skilled technologies are cheaper to imitate.
Note also that the skill bias of the technology in the adopting economy is increasing in , capturing the speed of technology transfer. In particular, in the limit case of = 0 (prohibitive barriers) each economy develops local technologies independently from the world frontier, and the skill abundance in the North becomes irrelevant:Ã S = Zh S
1
. To the opposite case, as ! 1; adoption is free so that the South is using the technology of the North. In this case, it is the local skill endowment that does not matter:
The latter is the case analyzed by AZ01.
Productivity Differences
As long as > 0; a balanced growth path features r S = r N r; with the South and the North growing at the same rate, in spite of there being neither trade nor factor mobility. The model yields then predictions for steady-state output and productivity di¤erences as functions of factor endowments and of exogenous parameters.
Proposition 1 For any S 2Ŝ; the steady-state output ratio relative to the frontier is
Proof. The production function, (2), yields
To obtain the equilibrium expression for A LS =A LN ; recall …rst that
where the relative pro…ts can be written as
using (5) and (6) . Next, note that, since the price of Y L equals its marginal product, then:
Next, (17) , (18) and (19) imply that:
We can now use (20) to substitute away A LS =A LN into (16):
Finally, eliminatingÃ N andÃ S from (21) using (10) and (14), respectively, and rearranging terms, yields (15) .
The formula of the output gap (15) resembles the ratio between two identical aggregate constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions. This is remarkable, since countries use in fact di¤erent technologies. However, the implied production function di¤ers from standard CES functions such as (1) : Given the structural parameters ; ; and Z, the right-hand side of the relative GDP equation is fully determined by the data of capital, low-skill labor and high-skill labor. Dividing both sides by the number of agents (workers) yields an accounting equation for GDP per capita (per worker).
As noted above, income di¤erences depend on a scale e¤ect, namely, larger countries are predicted to be ceteris paribus more productive. Interestingly, this e¤ect disappears as barriers to adoption vanish and all countries converge to the technology frontier. Indeed, as ! 1,
we have thatÃ S !Ã N and
which is the equation estimated by AZ01, who also set = 2. In particular, the lower the more the technology will re ‡ect local conditions. As we increase The skill bias of technology is re ‡ected in the wage inequality. The steady-state skill premium is given byw S = Z 1h
N , wherew S is increasing in , ranging from Figure 1 shows the long-run e¤ect of on wages for alternative relative skill endowments in the South. Increasing induces a rise in the skill premium which is a direct consequence of the previous …nding that a higher relative fraction of high-skill technologies are adopted as increases. Moreover, starting from = 2 , the rise in the skill premium is steeper in countries with low skill ratios because there are more high-skill technologies left to adopt.
Extensions: Trade and IPR
So far, we have only allowed countries to interact through technological spillovers. In this section we extend the analysis …rst to economies that trade in goods and then to economies that, in addition, can import technologies through licensing contracts. We refer to the latter case as full IPR enforcement.
International Trade
In this section, we assume that the intermediate good Y L and Y H can be traded internationally without frictions. Under free trade, there is a single world price for P L and P H :
where the superscript w refer to worldwide variables. Hence,
All equations in section 2.2 continue to hold, with local prices being now equal to the world price.
Consider, next, the innovation process in the North. The key observation is that the North continues to be the relevant market for new frontier technologies, since there is no IPR protection in the South. The pro…t ‡ows of Northern …rms are, then, LN = P w L L N = and
In a balanced-growth equilibrium,~ N = 1; which in turn implies that P w = Zh N 1 : Using (23) and rearranging terms (see proof below) leads to the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 In a free trade environment, the skill bias of the frontier technology is given by:
The skill bias of technology in country S 2Ŝ is given bỹ
Proof. Using (23) to substitute awayP w from the equationP w = Zh N 1 yields:
Solving out forÃ N yields:
We must now solve for the skill-speci…c distance-to-frontier terms. To this aim, note that, on the one hand, HS = HN = H S =H N and LS = LN = L S =L N . On the other hand, in a balanced growth path, HS = HN = c HS = and LS = LN = c LS = : Thus, c HS = H S =H N and c LS = L S =L N : Then, using (13) to eliminate c HS and c LS yields:
Plugging (28)- (29) into (27) yields (24) . Finally, (26) follows immediately from (24), (28) and (29) .
The numerator of (24) is identical to its no-trade counterpart, (10) . The denominator is smaller than unity, since Southern economies are skill scarce relative to the North. Thus, trade increases the skill bias of the frontier technology. This result generalizes the …nding of AZ01
to an environment in which technology adoption is costly. Equation (24) also shows that the "trade multiplier" depends on and on the relative market size and skill endowment of the two economies.Ã N increases with the di¤erence in the skill endowment between the North and the South. Trade increases the relative price of the good that is intensive in the factor that is relatively abundant in each country (i.e.,P in the North) and the e¤ect is larger the more di¤erent factor endowments are. Then, the stronger the increase inP in the North relative to the no-trade environment, the larger the skill bias induced by trade. Barriers (i.e., a reduction in ) increaseÃ N . The intuition behind this result is that since the frontier technology is skill biased, technology transfer reduces the di¤erence in e¤ective endowments. In other words, barriers reduce the skill bias of adoption, thereby strengthening the North-South pattern of specialization in production. As a consequence, the price e¤ect is larger when barriers are higher.
The e¤ect of trade on the direction of technology adoption in the South (equation (26)) is instead ambiguous. On the one hand, trade increases the relative price of low-skill-intensive goods in the South, accelerating the adoption of low-skill technologies. On the other hand, the higher skill bias at the frontier makes it cheaper to adopt skilled technologies. 4 The following proposition provides an expression for output di¤erences -the analogue of equation (15) 
where
Proof. Rewrite the production function as
and Y LJ andŶ HJ denote the quantities used in …nal production in country J: Due to trade, these quantities di¤er from the respective local production levels (which we continue to denote by 4 More formally,Ã
, showing that trade increases (decreases) the skill bias of technology adoption if is su¢ ciently large (small).
Y LJ and Y HJ ). Balanced trade implies that
is the same for all countries. Thus, for any S 2Ŝ; we can write:
where the second equality comes from (31) and from the fact thatŶ S =Ŷ N = P ŵ YŶ S = P ŵ YŶ N : Rearranging terms yields:
Then, using (29) and (23) to eliminate A LS =A LN andP w ; respectively, and rearranging terms, yields (30) .
As emphasized in Ventura (2005) still captures the extent of the scale e¤ect in adoption.
IPR (Licensing of Technologies)
In this section, we maintain free trade and also allow frontier technologies to be licensed from Northern to Southern (monopolist) …rms in exchange of a perpetual royalty per unit produced in the South. For simplicity, we assume that when a technology is licensed there are no additional adoption costs. While some local …rms could in principle choose to adopt frontier technologies that have not yet been licensed, in equilibrium all technologies will be licensed to the South as soon as they are introduced in the North. 5 Thus, no room is left for unlicensed technology adoption. Intuitively, this follows from the assumption that innovators can transfer technologies at zero costs. Therefore, no matter how low the cost of unlicensed adoption is, Northern producers will bid down the license cost and win the race. The discussion is summarized by the following Lemma. 
The equilibrium skill bias,Ã N (whereÃ S =Ã N ); is the determined implicitly by the following equation:
. Then, using
That is, there is factor price equalization and bothÃ IP R N andw N are now smaller. Moreover, for given Z, the skill premium may even turn negative. To prevent this unreasonable outcome, we assume that skilled workers can take unskilled jobs and that a skilled worker produces Z times as much as an unskilled worker regardless of the sector of employment. This implies that there is a lower boundw Z. When this lower bound is binding, the allocation of workers across the two sectors adjusts in order to keepw = Z. This leads to the following Proposition. 
Proof. The argument is parallel to the proof of Proposition 2. Whenw > Z, one obtains the analogue of expression (33) ,
where the only di¤erences between (33) and (35) ); and rearranging terms, leads to (34) . Whenw = Z, a similar argument applies after noticing that:
Cross-country productivity di¤erences are smaller under full IPR. However, it becomes important to draw a distinction between GDP and (Gross National Product) GNP: the GNP of the North now includes the royalties paid by Southern …rms. In general, it is ambiguous whether the GNP ratio increases with IPR. The growth rate of the world economy is unambiguously larger.
Empirical Analysis
In this section, we provide a quantitative assessment of the theory. The strategy is to use the no-trade economy of section 2 as the benchmark for a development accounting exercise. More precisely, we consider a relative production function of the form:
where f AU T S is given by (15). 6 Equation (36) allows for exogenous Hicks-neutral TFP di¤er-ences (i.e., the term S = N ) that are alien to our theory. Therefore, the success of our theory is measured by the extent to which the empirical variation in output and productivity can be accounted for without resorting to di¤erences in .
In the spirit of the development accounting literature (e.g., Caselli, 2005), we calibrate the key parameters, whenever this is possible. In particular, we set = 0:35 to match the non-labor share of GDP in industrialized countries, calibrate and Z so as to match the time evolution of the skill premium in the frontier economy using the predictions of our theory, and estimate so as to obtain the best …t of cross-country productivity di¤erences in two cross-sections of up to 122 countries (see section 4.4.2 for more discussion). As it is customary, we use the no-trade scenario as the baseline case, and assess how successfully the benchmark model can account for the cross-country productivity distribution in 1970 and 2000. Then, we perform a number of theory-based counterfactuals including: (i) slashing all barriers to technology adoption, (ii) opening up the world economy to free trade, and (iii) allowing, in addition, perfect international IPR enforcement. We study the changes in the long-run distribution of productivity di¤erences that each of these changes would trigger.
Data Description
Since our analysis focuses on balanced-growth equilibria, we do not attempt to …t highfrequency data, and focus on the distribution of cross-country productivity di¤erences in 1970 and 2000. We assume the US to be the frontier economy, and calibrate and Z using the change 
Calibration

Elasticity of Substitution
We identify and Z using equation (11) given the evolution of the skill premium in the US.
More formally, we set and Z so as to match exactly the equation:
log (w U S;t ) = ( 1) log(Z) + ( 2) log h U S;t ; 
The skill premia as well as the skill ratios are taken from the March CPS. As discussed above, counterfactually, a decline in the skill premium. In other words, our estimate > 2 appears to be consistent with the prediction of our theory, whereas lower values of are rejected by our estimation unless we assume that there are other exogenous drivers of skill-biased technical change, captured by an increase in Z.
Barriers to Technology Adoption
Having calibrated ; Z and as described above, we estimate by full information maximum likelihood (FIML) using the following econometric model:
where f AU T S is given by (15) , and log " S is an i.i.d. normally distributed disturbance with mean zero. Table 2 shows the estimation results with robust standard errors in parentheses. The four rows refer to di¤erent skill categories (sec and tert) and data sets (Barro-Lee (BL) and CohenSoto (CS)). Columns 1 and 2 report the point estimate of using the whole sample. Then, we allow to vary between OECD (columns 3 and 4) and non-OECD countries (columns 5 and 6).
The results show that is signi…cantly lower in non-OECD countries, 9 which is consistent with the interpretation that poor countries have larger barriers. Since there remains a great deal of heterogeneity within non-OECD countries, we split further the subsample into sub-Saharan (columns 7 and 8) and other non-OECD countries (columns 9 and 10). 10 The di¤erences in barriers to technology adoption between both the sub-Saharan and other non-OECD countries and OECD and non-OECD countries are in all but one cases highly signi…cant. 11 Another pattern emerges from the table:
The estimated approximately doubles between 1970-2000 for OECD countries, while there is no big change for non-OECD countries. This suggests that technological integration increased mostly within the set of industrialized countries. Figure 2 plots the predicted GDP pw (log-di¤erence from the US) against the actual GDP pw for all countries, using educational variables from the Barro-Lee data set and allowing to di¤er across OECD, sub-Saharan and other non-OECD countries, as in Table 2 . Panels 9 We classify as OECD all countries that were OECD members in 2000 (same classi…cation in both 1970 and 2000 to limit endogeneity issues). Including only countries that were OECD members in 1970 yields similar results. The estimates for OECD countries are then higher while those for non-OECD countries remain almost unchanged. For instance, the point estimate for OECD countries in the third row of To compare the goodness of …t of the two models more formally, we use the statistic proposed by AZ01:
Results
where log(y S j =y U S ) denotes the log-di¤erence in output per worker from the US in the data and c log(y S j =y U S ) the prediction of the model for the same country. < 2 would be equal to 1, if all points were aligned on the 45-degree line. In this case, the model would …t the data perfectly. Note that < 2 is not a standard R-squared, and can be negative if the …t is su¢ ciently low. Table 3 reports the < 2 for the three speci…cations of Table 2 , and for comparison also the case of no barriers (column 4). In column 1 all countries are constrained to have the same .
In column 2 is allowed to di¤er between OECD and non-OECD countries. Finally, in 3, we also allow to di¤er between sub-Saharan and other non-OECD countries. In all cases, the model with barriers attains a much better …t than the model with no barriers. 12 The model with no barriers is also rejected in a formal Wald test.
A concern is that our estimation may imply A LS =A L;U S and/or A HS =A H;U S larger than unity, violating the assumption that the US is the technology leader in both sectors. To address 1 2 The results are not directly comparable with those of AZ01. First their model implies = 2; and they set Z 2 f1:5; 1:8g to match the skill premium. Second, they use data for 1990. To make the comparison more direct, we re-estimated our model after calibrating = 2 and Z = 1:8; using the two educational measures from BL for the year of 2000. The < 2 of the model without barriers is 0.871 and 0.766 using sec and tert, respectively.
In contrast, the < 2 of column 3 in Table 3 Alternatively, the assumption that large developing economies such as China and India have frictionless internal markets may be incorrect. Altogether, we …nd it reassuring that -with only two (important) exceptions -the assumption that the US is the leader is consistent with our estimation, without the need of imposing any additional restriction.
Counterfactuals
In this section we use our model as a lab to perform three counterfactual experiments. We assume the economies to be initially in the no-trade steady state of year 2000, and study the long-run e¤ect of institutional changes on cross-country inequality. The three experiments consist of, respectively: (i) removing all barriers to technology adoption, (ii) opening up the world economy to frictionless international trade, and (iii) introducing, in addition, full international IPR enforcement. We focus on steady-state e¤ects.
We limit our discussion to the tert skill measure from the Barro-Lee data set and to the case in which di¤ers between OECD, sub-Saharan and other non-OECD countries (column 3 to 4 and 7 to 10 in Table 2 ). The parameters ; Z; and are held constant across experiments at the levels of section 4.2 (with the exception of experiment (i) when we let ! 1). Since physical capital is endogenous, we allow the capital-output ratio to respond to institutional changes. We do so by …rst inferring from the observed capital-output ratios the cross-country distribution of the deep parameter (the "investment wedge") in the benchmark no-trade case.
Next, we calculate the capital-output ratio that would obtain in each of the counterfactual steady states (no barriers, free trade and trade with full IPR enforcement) assuming no change in : Since our target is to estimate relative productivities, we focus on the distribution of investment wedges relative to the North. For country S such ratio is given by:
where the right hand-side term is the capital-output ratio in the data, and we continue to assume the US to be the frontier economy. Next, letting variables indexed by the superscript count 2 fnobarr; trade; IP Rg denote theoretical steady-state levels in each counterfactual, we obtain:
Replacing (22), (30) and (34) , and rearranging terms, yields the steady-state expressions for output and productivity reported in each of the subsections below.
No Barriers
In this section, we experiment with slashing all technology barriers. Such experiment di¤ers from the analysis in Section 4.2.3, as there we treated the no-barrier model as an alternative model and estimated equation (22) taking the capital ratio directly from the data. In contrast, here we infer the from the benchmark case and let capital adjust in each country to the new steady state, as discussed above. The gains in output per worker will be larger for countries with smaller investment wedges, since slashing barriers induces a stronger increase in investments in physical capital in those countries.
We obtain the following counterfactual steady-state output gaps: 
Trade
In this section we consider the e¤ects of opening up the world economy to free trade. The counterfactual steady-state output di¤erences are given by equation (30) 
As discussed in section 3.1, trade increases the skill bias of the frontier technology, while its e¤ect on the skill bias of technology adoption is ambiguous.
Panel (b) in Figure 5 plots c log(y trade S =y trade U S ) against the predictions of the benchmark model. Cross-country income inequality increases signi…cantly, and so does the distance of most countries from the US frontier. The GDP pw relative to the US decreases for the average OECD country from 0.68 to 0.41, while the non-OECD countries fall from 0.19 to 0.10. Among the OECD countries that realize the largest losses are Italy, Luxembourg, Austria, France, and Finland. However, it is also important to remind that trade implies an increase in the growth rate of all economies, so a loss in relative terms does not imply a welfare loss.
Trade and IPR
In this section, we focus on trade with perfect IPR protection, following the theoretical analysis of section 3.2. The counterfactual steady-state output di¤erences are given by equation (34) 
As discussed in section 3.2, all countries use now the frontier technology, as in the case of no barriers. However, the frontier technology is now less skill biased. Panel (c) in Figure 5 plots c log(y IP R S =y IP R U S ) against the productivity di¤erences predicted by the benchmark model. The results are similar to those in panel (a), but the relative gains of non-frontier economies are larger. Many economies -including most European countries -would now surpass the US. The reason is twofold. First, the skill bias of the technology targets the average world endowment so innovation is too little skill biased for the most skilled rich countries such as the US. Second, many countries have a higher capital output ratio than the US. However, it is important to remember that non-frontier countries must transfer to the US a signi…cant share of their GDP as license fees. So, the di¤erences in GNP may be signi…cantly larger than the di¤erences in GDP.
Overall, these results are in line with AZ01 and Bon…glioli and Gancia (2008) , who show in more speci…c models that trade opening with no global IPR protection may induce a wave of technological progress which favors disproportionately the North, while stronger IPR protection in the South can speed up technology transfer and reduce income di¤erences.
Wage Inequality
Finally, we consider the prediction of the theory for the changes in wage inequality in the three counterfactual scenarios relative to the benchmark case. Recallw S = Z P S Ã S : In autarky, P S andÃ S are given by (7) and (14), respectively. The same expressions hold with no barriers to adoption after letting ! 1. In the free-trade case, prices are equalized worldwide tõ
, whereĥ is given by (25) . Finally, in the case of trade with IPR, we havew S = max
, whereh w is the world average relative skill endowment. Figure 6 plots the log-change in the steady-state skill premium for tertiary school against GDP per worker relative to the US when barriers are removed starting from the benchmark steady state equilibrium. Removing barriers implies an increase in the skill premia of nonfrontier economies, since costly adoption reduces the skill bias of the technology adoption.
The e¤ect is stronger the farther away from the frontier a country is. For the average non-OECD country the skill premium increases by 25 percent, while it rises only by 3 percent among OECD countries. Figure 7 plots the corresponding log-change in the steady-state skill premium when an economy switches to free trade. Opening up to free trade in goods raises the skill premium in skill-abundant countries and lowers it in skill-scarce countries, as predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. However, by also inducing skill-biased technical change at the frontier, it generates an upward pressure on the skill premium worldwide. As a result, wage inequality increases in the majority of countries, particularly in skill-abundant and low-barriers countries. The conventional result that trade liberalization lowers inequality in skill-scarce countries holds only in the group of economies facing the highest barriers to technology adoption (for instance, in sub-Saharan countries the skill premium falls on average by 42 percent), while wage inequality rises even in India and China.
Finally, when IPR are also protected (no …gure), the relevant market for new technologies becomes the world economy. This promotes the development of low-skill technologies and thus a fall in the skill premium. Moreover, since all countries now use the same technologies, all wages become the same everywhere. Given the large endowment of unskilled labor of the world economy, we …nd that with trade and IPR protectionÃ falls so much that the constraint w S Z becomes binding. Thus, in the new steady state wage inequality drops tow = Z in all countries. Before concluding, it is important to emphasize that these large changes in skill premia re ‡ect the rather extreme nature of our counterfactual scenarios. The e¤ect of partial integration of the markets for goods and technology would certainly be smaller. It is also important to stress that our model abstracts from di¤erences in labor market institutions and policies which are likely to a¤ect the cross-country pattern of skill premia and its change under the alternative scenarios.
Robustness
In this section we analyze the robustness of our results. First, we study the robustness of the model to di¤erent calibrations of : Then, we compare our results with those that would obtain from an atheoretical development accounting exercise. Next, we test the robustness of the results to a weaker form of the market size e¤ect. Last, we estimate the model under the alternative assumption that in year 2000 all economies are open to international trade.
Lower Short-Run Elasticity of Substitution
In this part, we study the robustness of our model to a di¤erent calibration of : Earlier studies …nd the short-run elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor to be in the range 2 [1:5; 2] : It is important to stress that < 2 is inconsistent in our model with the observation of increasing skill premia in the US during 1970-2000. To reconcile lower 's with the evolution of the skill premium in the US, we must then allow for an exogenous increase in
Z.
The new calibration is summarized in Table 4 , where we restrict attention to tert from the Barro-Lee dataset which is our preferred measure of skill. Table 4 : Robustness calibration Table 5 shows the new estimates of . When = 2; the results are qualitative similar to those of the benchmark case, although the estimates of are somewhat larger. The < 2 are still above 0.9, and the di¤erences in across groups and time remain at the signi…cance level of the baseline estimation in Table 2 . In summary, our analysis is not a¤ected by setting = 2: When = 1:5; the results continue to be similar to the benchmark case. The estimates go further up, and the level of signi…cance reduces to 5 percent between OECD and non-OECD countries in 2000. In spite of this, the goodness of …t stays above 0.9. Table 5 : Robustness estimation
Alternative Speci…cations
A number of papers (discussed in the introduction) perform development accounting exercises based on reduced form aggregate production functions such as equation (1) . The wisdom of this literature is that the model can replicate the empirical cross-country productivity distribution as long as one imposes su¢ ciently low elasticities of substitution between factors of production.
For instance, Caselli (2005) shows that if one calibrates a production function with physical and human capital allowing for very low values of the elasticity of substitution, one can …t arbitrarily well the cross-country data. In this paper, we allow ourselves no freedom in the choice of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, which we taken to be unit as it is standard in the growth accounting literature. In addition, we estimate the short-run elasticity of substitution between high-and low-skill labor using the time-series implication of the theory. The only parameter on which we impose no a priori restriction is . We should note, though, that our theory imposes that the long-run elasticity of substitution between highand low-skill labor be larger than the short-term elasticity. Thus, estimating does not imply a degree of freedom in the choice of the elasticity of substitution, and our theory precludes that a good …t can arise from low elasticities.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to compare the success of our theory with that of a reduced form production function approach. 13 For the sake of such comparison, we estimate the following alternative (reduced form) model:
subject to the restriction that labor markets are competitive, implying that:
wherew U S is the observed skill premium in the US and 0 is the elasticity of substitution between low-and high-skill labor.
Consistent with previous studies, we …nd that the best …t of this model obtains with low elasticities of substitution between high-and low-skill workers. Table 3 range between 0:903 and 0:952. In addition, the reduced form model systematically underpredicts the cross-country productivity di¤erences for reasonable values of . On both grounds, the reduced form model performs signi…cantly worse than our structural model with tertiary education. In sum, a reduced form model without market-size e¤ects does not outperform our structural model.
Weaker Market Size E¤ ect
Our model implies a strong market size e¤ect. In this section, we test the robustness of the results to a more general functional form for technology adoption implying that the cost of 1 3 It is important to note that our model is not observationally equivalent to a standard aggregate constant returns to scale CES production function like (1) for two reasons. First, the parameter implies a crossrestriction between the skill bias of the adopted technology and the long-run elasticity of substitution between high-and low-skill labor. Second, it features a market-size e¤ects in the process of technology adoption, parameterized by the exponent (1 + ) = ( + ) > 1 in the right-hand side of (15) .
adopting new technologies may increase in market size. We assume that:
where 0: This model nests the benchmark case in (13) This allows us to analyze models with a weaker market size e¤ect. Relative output is then
given by while there is no signi…cant change (the point estimate being in fact somewhat lower) for non-OECD countries. However, the estimated barriers are signi…cantly larger for all countries, or equivalently the elasticity of technology adoption to the distance to the frontier is lower. In addition, it appears as if there is no technology spillover to sub-Saharan countries that develop their technologies in complete isolation ( = 0). It is worth remarking that the improvement in the …tness is only marginal, indicating that the data cannot discriminate clearly between the two models.
Openness
In our analysis, we have followed the tradition of the development accounting literature assuming all economies to be closed. Free trade was only considered as a counterfactual. However, the absence of trade is a straightjacket, especially for more recent years. For this reason, in this section we re-estimate the model under the alternative assumption that there is free trade in year 2000, based on the results of Proposition 2.
Under free trade, the estimated barriers for OECD countries become very small, i.e., the estimated is very high and also imprecisely estimated. The restriction that there are no technological barriers for OECD countries cannot be rejected at standard con…dence levels. 14 Therefore, we impose the constraint that ! 1 for OECD countries. We report the result of the estimation using tertiary schooling from BL as the measure of skill. This results in = 10:06 than the closed-economy model. Figure 8 shows that there is a signi…cant improvement in the …t of emerging economies such as China, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Mexico and Brazil. This is consistent with the observation that these economies are very open to international trade.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have built and estimated a model of the world income distribution based on the following ingredients: di¤erent types of labor (skilled and unskilled workers), crosscountry di¤erences in factor endowments and in the cost of capital, factor-biased (directed) technical progress and costly technology adoption. Our framework accounts for three sources of income di¤erences: barriers to technology adoption, the inappropriateness (excessive skillbias) of frontier technologies to local conditions and capital market imperfections. While each of these elements is not new, our contribution is to combine them into a uni…ed empirical model which can be used to gauge the relative importance of di¤erent factors generating low productivity and to perform counterfactual experiments.
We summarize here the major …ndings. First, despite the parsimonious speci…cation, the 1 4 In practice, we test that 2000 =1 0 000 0 000 cannot be rejected for the OECD countries.
model provides a good …t of the world income distribution. This suggests that the theory of directed technical change is broadly consistent with aggregate data once properly extended to consider technology adoption and international spillovers. Second, both barriers to adoption and the excessive skill-bias of frontier technologies appear to be quantitatively important. We …nd that barriers are higher in less developed countries and that they have fallen over time for OECD countries only. The complete removal of barriers would increase output per worker relative to the US (the e¤ect is more pronounced for non-OECD countries) and would lead to higher skill premia. Third, we have used the model to study how the forces of globalization can shape the world income distribution. In the absence of global IPR protection, we …nd that integration of good markets is followed by SBTC, higher income disparities, and rising skill premia in the majority of countries. These results are however reverted if trade liberalization is coupled with international protection of IPR.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of interesting directions. For instance, we have estimated our benchmark model under the assumption of no international trade and we have then studied globalization as a counterfactual experiment. While this is useful to understand the e¤ects of economic integration, an alternative route would have been to estimate the model taking into account the degree of openness of each country. Finally, although our theory suggests that the removal of barriers to technology adoption has strong distributional consequences, we have not explored how these may generate a political support for the existence of barriers. We believe that including these consideration into the model may shed some light on the important question of which political institutions and reforms can be useful to speed up the much needed process of technological convergence. Note: plots log(y S /y U S ) against log(y S /y U S ) across time and skill categories, ξ varies across OECD, subSaharan and other countries. Note: plots log(y S /y U S ) against log(y S /y U S ) across time and skill categories, ξ → ∞ for all countries. 
